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EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE GAINED BY UsE OF DETECTAPHONE Appellant was indicted for conspiracy to violate the Bankruptcy Act.1

An agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was permitted by the custodian
of the ouilding to enter appellant's office without his knowledge, and to install
a dictaphone connecting with an adjoining room. However, the dictaphone
failed to operate, and the only evidence which tjle •agents were able to get was
by means of a detectaphone which was in the same room with the agents, and
which was not connected with the dictaphone. Held, the detectaphone recordings
were admissible in evidence because no trespass was committed in getting the
information, and no communication was intercepted within the meaning of
section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934.2 Goldman v. United States,
(U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 993, affirming United States v. Goldman, (C. C. A.
2d, 1941) II8 F. (2d) 310.
The United States Supreme Court has given a broad interpretation to
section 605 of the Communications Act by applying its prohibitions to officers
of the federal government, 3 by holding that it applies to intrastate as well as
interstate communications,4 and !Jy ruling that evidence made accessible because
of information obtained by "tapping" is also inadmissible.5 In the light of this
broad interpretation of the statute, and in view of the Court's attitude toward
wire tapping, it might well have been assumed, before the principal case was
decided, that evidence garnered'by means of the detectaphone would be excluded
by the Supreme Court. Indeed,.under the Supreme Court's former definition of
"interception," as used in the Communications Act, it might be argued that

30 Stat. L. 554, § 29 (b) (1892), II U.S. C. (1940), § 52 (b).
no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person." 48 Stat. L. 1064 at I 103,
47 U.S. C. (1940), § 605.
This restraint upon the activities of our law enforcement officers does not rest
upon the. search and seizure provisions of the Federal Constitution, but arises under the
commerce power, and the power of Congress over federal officers. See Sablowsky v.
United States, (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) IOI F. (2d) 183.
3 Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275 (1937).
4 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 60 S. Ct. 269 (1939); United States
v. Jenello, (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 587; Diamond v. United States, (C. C. A.
6th, 1938) 108 F. (2d) 859, denying rehearing in 94 F. (2d) 1012; Sablowsky v.
United States, (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) IOI F. (2d) 183.
5 The second Nardone case, Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S. Ct.
266 (1939).
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the detectaphone falls within its scope. 6 Though the decision of the courts are
based on the concrete prohibitions of the Communications Act, or on the Constitution, the courts are inclined to stress the breach of privacy in strengthening
the case against the admission of evidence procured by means of unauthorized
interceptions of communications. 7 This tendency appears to be the result of the
courts' adopting the view that it is better that some wrongdoers go free than to
have government officers "resort to methods deemed inconsistent with ethical
standards and destructive of personal liberty." 8 However, the Court felt that to
apply the prohibitions of the Communications Act to evidence gained by use of the
detectaphone, which use here was not in violation of the constitutional provision against unreasonable search and seizure, would be extending the scope
of the section beyond that intended by Congress. The detectaphone is not in any
way connected with the wire which carries the conversation of the parties; the
device does not receive the communications of both parties, but only that of the
person in the room in which the sounds are picked up by the detectaphone.
There is no "tap" made; the instrument does no more than make audible sounds
which would otherwise be inaudible to the human ear. 9 Since evidence gained by
means of eavesdropping is admissible,1° it seems that evidence obtained by means
of the detectaphone comes within the same principle. In view of the facts that
Congress has never expressly prohibited wire tapping by our law enforcement
officers, that the detectaphone does not intercept communications in the manner
of "tapping," that a secret entry or trespass is not necessary for its operation,
6
United States v. Polakoff, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 888. Although the
Communications Act provides that the permission of the sender removes the prohibition
against disclosure, the court in this case held that the permission of both parties is neces-sary, and that the permission of the person originating the call is not sufficient. Here
also there was no "tap," but rather an extension was made on the originator's telephone,
yet the court held that this was an interception within the act. It would seem that this
view places no discernible limit upon the extent to which the act may be interpreted.
1 This appears to be the basis for the dissent by Justice Murphy in the principal
case. The dissent by Justice Holmes in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438,
48 S. Ct. 564 (1928), is typical of the opposition towards government officers indulging in the "unethical" practice of "tapping." See 9 INT. JuR. AssN. BULL. 97 (1941)
for a rather detailed account of the opposition to wire tapping; it seems that the
spectre of an American "Gestapo" looms large in the thinking of those who would bar
the use of this device to our law enforcement officers. It should be noted, however,
that not allowing the evidence gathered by means of the outlawed device to be admitted
in court is no deterrent to its use for other purposes. It would seem that enforcement
of the existing penalties would be a greater deterrent than merely refusing to admit the
evidence. See 27 MICH. L. REv. 78 (1928); 30 J. CRIM. L. 945 (1940); 20 BoST.
UNIV. L. REv. 362 (1940).
•
8 Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 at 383, 58 S. Ct. 275 (1937). See
the dissent by Justice Sutherland in which he says, 302 U. S. at 387, that the "necessity of public protection against crime is being submerged by an overflow of sentimentality."
9 This is the view held by the _district court in the principal case. See I I 8 F. ( 2d)
310.
10 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1928).
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and that there is an increased need for the detection of crime, it is submitted that
the Court was correct in allowing the testimony of the agents as to the remarks
heard by means of the detectaphone.

